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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel countermeasure framework to
detect spoofing attacks to reduce the vulnerability of auto-
matic speaker verification (ASV) systems. Recently, ASV sys-
tems have reached equivalent performances equivalent to those
of other biometric modalities. However, spoofing techniques
against these systems have also progressed drastically. Exper-
imentation using advanced speech synthesis and voice conver-
sion techniques has showed unacceptable false acceptance rates
and several new countermeasure algorithms have been explored
to detect spoofing materials accurately. However, the counter-
measures proposed so far are based on the acoustic differences
between natural speech signals and artificial speech signals, ex-
pected to become gradually smaller in the near future. In this
paper, we focus on voice liveness detection, which aims to vali-
date whether the presented speech signals originated from a live
human. We use the phenomenon of pop noise, which is a dis-
tortion that happens when human breath reaches a microphone,
as liveness evidence. This paper proposes pop noise detection
algorithms and shows through an experimental study that they
can be used to discriminate live voice signals from artificial ones
generated by means of speech synthesis techniques.
Index Terms: automatic speaker verification, voice liveness de-
tection, anti-spoofing, countermeasure, pop noise
1. Introduction
It is well known that biometric authentication has an important
role in reliable management systems nowadays [1, 2]. Auto-
matic speaker verification (ASV) is also an easy-to-use biomet-
ric authentication system using only speakers’ voice samples.
Recently, the performance of the ASV techniques has been im-
proved as a result of e.g. i-Vector [3, 4] or PLDA (probabilistic
linear discriminant analysis) [5] developments, and there are a
lot of reports regarding state-of-the-art schemes that show po-
tential to support mass-market adoption. Meanwhile, speech
synthesis [6, 7] and speech transformation [8], which are tech-
nologies to generate natural-sounding artificial speech with the
targeted speaker’s voice from a given text or an inputted speech
waveform uttered by someone else, have progressed. They are
also active and important research topics in speech informa-
tion processing because the technologies may help individuals
with vocal or communicative disabilities for instance. However,
such technologies can be used to falsify profiles or identities
and perform spoofing attacks against ASV systems, represent-
ing a serious challenge to the successful operation of these sys-
tems [9–11]. Research on the definition and development of
countermeasures for the detection of spoofing attacks already
exists [12–15]. Conventionally, attacks of three different na-
tures are considered: replay, speech synthesis, and voice con-
version. Countermeasure strategies are mainly based on com-
paring acoustic features of artificial signals with those of natu-
ral ones [16–18]. Spectral, F0 and modulation-related features
are among the features used to compute the countermeasures.
However, we expect the acoustic differences between artificial
and natural speech to gradually become smaller and eventually
marginal in the near future.
Looking at other biometrics fields, we see that face, finger-
print, and even iris recognition systems also suffer from spoof-
ing attacks, and researchers have continued to develop several
countermeasures to overcome this problem [19–21]. One of the
most effective countermeasures in other biometrics fields is to
use a “liveness detection” framework that ensures that the per-
son attempting authentication is alive. For image processing
fields, it has been reported that liveness detection frameworks
have reduced vulnerability significantly [22–24]. We can use
the same concept for the ASV system and propose a counter-
measure algorithm based on voice liveness detection (VLD),
so we can detect spoofing materials more robustly. An impor-
tant question is how we ensure the liveness of presented speech
signals to validate whether the presented signals are originated
from a live human or not. For this purpose, in this paper we
focus on pop noise detection. Since pop noise is a common dis-
tortion in speech occurring when human breath reaches a mi-
crophone and is poorly reproduced by loudspeakers [25, 26],
it seems reasonable to consider it as natural evidence of live-
ness at the input of an authentication system. A measure that
takes into account the presence of pop noise phenomena might
therefore represent therefore a good basis to discriminate be-
tween live or played speech (via loudspeakers). This paper pro-
poses two VLD detection strategies to reduce the vulnerability
of ASV systems. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
VLD frameworks, we have recorded some speech on a small
database including voice samples with pop noise. An experi-
mental evaluation was carried out to explore the performance
of the proposed techniques, showing, as it will be furthermore
reported, significant benefits when incorporating them as VLD
modules within the ASV process.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the
framework of the voice liveness detection is showed, and pop
noise extraction algorithms are illustrated in section 3. Section 4
describes design of database that includes pop noise. Section 5
and section 6 presents the experimental results and conclusions.
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Figure 1: Overview of automatic speaker verification system
including VLD module
2. Voice liveness detection for speaker
verification system
2.1. Attack to speaker verification systems
The potential for ASV to be spoofed is well recognized and
there is growing interest in assessing the vulnerabilities of ASV
systems and developing countermeasures [9, 10]. The counter-
measures target three main types of spoofing attacks: replay,
speech synthesis, and voice conversion. Each type of attack is
defined as follows:
• Replay: replay of pre-recorded utterances of the target
speaker.
• Speech synthesis: automatic generation of synthesized
speech signals of the targeted speaker based on any input
text.
• Voice conversion: conversion of attacker’s natural voice
towards that of the targeted speaker.
Several countermeasures against each type of spoofing attack
have been reported. We can simply use text-prompted ASVs
and change prompts every time to protect against replay attacks
[27, 28]. However, no methods have reached a fundamental so-
lution against the spoofing attacks using speech synthesis and
voice conversion. Considering the actual procedures for spoof-
ing attacks, all spoofing attacks have to play spoofing speech via
loudspeakers. In other words, if we can distinguish speech pro-
duced by a live human from speech played via loudspeakers, we
can protect against all types of spoofing attacks including even
attacks using unknown voice conversion and speech synthesis
methods.
2.2. Framework of voice liveness detection
Figure 1 shows a diagram of an automatic speaker verification
system including the VLD module. The VLD module aims to
reject all speech signals that do not include liveness evidence
regardless of spoofing type. Speaker verification is conducted
as usual in a subsequent module. Although this figure illus-
trates a sequential combination of VLD and ASV modules, it is
also possible to carry out the VLD and ASV modules simulta-
neously.
What is the liveness evidence included in a speech wave-
form? The VLD needs to detect and capture characteristics in-
cluded only in speech produced by a live human. The human
voice can be briefly described as a result of acoustic shaping in
the vocal tract of the airflow produced following the interaction
between various elements such as lungs, vocal chords, and lips.
Then, to record the sound, the resulting airflow is transformed
Figure 2: Spectrogram comparison of recording using (top) or
not using pop filter (bottom). Significant differences can be seen
at low frequency at locations perceived to have pop noise.
to an acoustical signal when it is captured via a microphone. As
a consequence of spontaneous strong breathing the convolution
process between the airflow and the vocal cavities may result in
a sort of perceived plosive burst, commonly know as pop noise,
which can be captured via a microphone. On the other hand,
the acoustic conditions change when this same sound is played
via loudspeakers, commonly resulting in a poor reproduction
of pop noise phenomena. Thus, by detecting pop noise events,
we may be able to distinguish live human voices from playback
sound via loudspeakers.
3. Voice liveness detection algorithms
To capture the phenomenon of pop noise as liveness evidence,
this paper proposes two VLD detection strategies to reduce the
vulnerability of ASV systems.
3.1. Low-frequency-based single channel detection
Pop noise in single channel signals are found in speech wave-
forms as sudden irregular modulations of strong energy within
varying durations typically ranging between 20 and 100 msec.
This phenomenon appears as high energy regions at very low
frequency compared to when using a pop noise filter, as shown
in Figure 2. This gives us a clue to define a simple strategy for
detection.
More precisely, we firstly define the measure LFnrg(k) as
the average of the Fourier transform (FT) bins within the inter-
val [0, LFmax]. The frequency precision should be high enough
to explore a very low-band with more than a single FT bin. Ac-
cordingly, an analysis window of size N , corresponding to a
precision of 10Hz in the FT and LFmax = 40Hz was found
as a sufficient choices. Note that LFmax might be set below ex-
pected pitch values in order to not consider energy contributions
from harmonic content. Following, LFnrg(k) was computed
over frames of size N with a hop-size of M = N/8 and pop
noise events Ploc(i)were identified as the maxima ofLFnrg(k)
with values larger than three times its standard-deviation, keep-
ing a minimum distance of D = 1.5N between candidates.
The boundaries are estimated by approximation in the
neighbourhood of each Ploc(i) according to two conditions:
firstly, a drop in LFnrg(k) of LFdr = 0.35 times the value at
Ploc(i). Then, the boundaries are extended if the absolute value
of the derivative of LFnrg(k) is higher than LFddr = 0.35
times its value at Ploc(i). With these conditions we aim to as-
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Figure 3: Example of pop noise detection based on single chan-
nel method. Time-domain signals (top), average low-band en-
ergy (middle), its derivate (bottom), and the detected pop noise
boundaries (red dotted).
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Figure 4: Recording process in two channel method
sert a minimum/maximum energy variation (velocity) once it
is ensured: similarly, there will be a relative increment/drop in
the pop noise energy. An example can be seen in Figure 3,
which shows the waveform of the recording version (top). It
also shows the computed LFnrg(k) for the waveform with pop
noise (middle) and its derivate (bottom). The detected bound-
aries are denoted by the red dotted intervals.
Although the configuration of the processing parameters
should be manually verified for significant pop noised cases,
the suggested parameters, empirically found, showed sufficient
performance on samples of several speakers of our database.
3.2. Subtraction-based pop noise detection with two chan-
nels
The pop noise detection algorithm using a single channel mi-
crophone is focused on low-frequency energy. To capture the
whole frequency components of the pop noise, another pop
noise detection algorithm is proposed here.
In the second algorithm, two microphones are used and
only one of them has a pop filter as shown in Figure 4. Let
Fx(b, w) and Fp(b, w) be the short-time Fourier transforms
(STFT) of the filtered speech and non-filtered speech respec-
tively, where b andw stand for the indices of time frame and an-
gular frequency. In the two channel method, assuming that only
Fp(b, w) includes pop noise, it is estimated by subtracting the
ordinary speech component from Fp(b, w) by using Fx(b, w)
as follows.
D(b, ω) = Fp(b, ω)− C(ω)Fx(b, ω), (1)
where C(ω) represents a compensation filter between the fre-
quency characteristics of the two channels. An estimate of
C(ω) to minimize
∑
b,ω |D(b, ω)|2 can be represented as fol-
lows.
C(ω) =
∑
b Fp(b, w)Fx(b, w)
∗∑
b |Fx(b, w)|2
, (2)
where ∗ denotes complex conjugate.
4. Design of database
Since the proposed framework focuses on speech signals that
include pop noise, a database of speech signals that includes
pop noise is required. Recently, the NIST SRE database [29]
has been used globally for the evaluation sets of ASV sys-
tems. However, the database provides conversational telephone
speech and it contains no pop noise, so the proposed frame-
work could not evaluate the conventional databases. Therefore,
a new database including pop noise signals is required to be
constructed. It is well know that some kinds of microcphones
are very sensitive to breath noise [30, 31]. However, there is
no preliminary information about pop noise recording and mi-
crophone types to be used. Then, we have used three types of
microphones as below:
• Microphone with a voice recorder (VOICE) (SONEY
ECM-DM5P)
• Compatible microphone with camcorder (CAM) (SONY
ECM-XYST1M)
• Microphone with a headset (HEADSET) (SHURE
SM10A-CN)
Two microphones of each type are used where one has a pop
filter and the other does not (Fig. 4). That is, we designed a six-
channel microphone system (Fig. 5). The characteristics of the
microphones are as follows. The VOICE microphone is most
sensitive to pop noise, and even when using a pop filter, pop
noise is often obtained. There is a clear difference between the
waveforms of the CAM microphone with a pop filter and those
without any pop filter when compared to those of the VOICE
microphones. The waveforms of the HEADSET microphones
are almost the same with a pop filter and without any pop filter;
nevertheless, the HEADSET microphones were set closest to
the speaker’s mouth. The speech signals were sampled at a 48
kHz with a 16 bit rate.
We have recorded a total of 17 female speakers of Japanese.
Each speaker reads out 100 sentences in total. Half of the sen-
tences are know to all the speakers and the other half are ran-
domly selected from Japanese News paper Article Sentences
(JNAS) [32], and each speaker uses a different set of randomly
selected sentences. The 50 common sentences are chosen based
on phonetic coverage. We also pre-selected relatively short sen-
tences from the JNAS corpus before the random selection of the
rest of the 50 sentences.
5. Evaluation experiments
5.1. Experimental conditions
We used 30 randomly selected utterances for each microphone
without the pop filter for each speaker as live samples of test
data. The spoofing materials used in our experiments were
constructed based on the statistical parametric speech synthesis
framework described in [6]. Its speaker adaptation techniques
in this framework allow the generation of a synthetic voice us-
ing as little as a few minutes of recorded speech from the target
speaker [33]. The speaker adaptation algorithm used is struc-
tural variational Bayesian linear regression [34]. We used 50
Figure 5: Six microphones are used simultaneously for record-
ing speech data with and without pop filters. Distance from and
position in relation to speaker’s mouth for each microphone are
fixed roughly.
common sentences recorded via the headset microphone with
the pop filter to perform the speaker adaptation of speech syn-
thesis systems (because the pop filter is always used for normal
recordings of speech synthesis data). Using the speech syn-
thesizers of individual target speakers, we synthesized artificial
speech signals for spoofing. The texts used for speech synthesis
are the above randomly selected utterances of each speaker. The
spoofing materials were then played with a loudspeaker (BOSE
111AD) toward the video camera and condenser microphones.
For the ASV system, we used the standard GMM-UBM-
based speaker verification method [35], and the speaker-
dependent models of individual speakers in the ASV system
were constructed using the 50 common and 20 randomly se-
lected sentences of each speaker recorded via the headset mi-
crophone with a pop filter. In this paper, we investigate the
effectiveness of the VLD module, and we do not focus on using
the state-of-the-art ASV system. The number of mixtures were
set to 2048, and the UBM was trained by about 23000 utter-
ances from JNAS database [32], which is the standard speech
database for automatic speech and speaker recognition area in
Japan. For the STFT analysis, the Hamming window is selected
as a window function, and the window width and the window
shift are set to 4096 and 2048 points.
5.2. Experimental results
Table 1 shows the equal error rate (EER) of the VLD meth-
ods with the test date with a single channel algorithm and two
channels algorithms. For each algorithm, the EER is calculated
when the percentage of misclassified live voice (false positive
rate) is equal to the percentage of misclassified artificial voice
(false negative rate). From the results of the single channel algo-
rithm, we were able to be capture, significantly, human liveness
information via voice recorder microphone and headset micro-
phone. Even though the performance of the VLD module is
dependent on the microphone types, this result illustrates that
the VLD framework is effective to reduce the vulnerability of
ASV systems. In the single channel method, we assume that the
phenomenon of pop noise is strongly affected at low frequency.
The two channel method also shows the effectiveness of using
pop noise for VLD module. However, comparing the single
channel method with the two channel method, the two channel
method was obtained small improvement. This means that pop
noise affects to the voice at low-frequency. Consequently, the
proposed VLD framework is precisely effective method against
Table 1: EERs of VLD algorithms with some microphones
Microphone Single ch. Two ch.
VOICE 4.73% 29.11%
CAM 36.06% 45.52%
HEADSET 3.95% 5.88%
Table 2: EERs of the ASV system with test data which includes
Spoofing Attacks data (w/ SA) or not (w/o SA). And the EERs
of the VLD+ASV system.
VLD+ASV
microphone w/o SA w/ SA single ch. two ch.
VOICE 5.49% 5.53% 5.48% 5.49%
CAM 4.69% 6.61% 5.23% 5.30%
HEADSET 4.28% 6.61% 4.45% 4.28%
the spoofing method.
Secondary, VLD+ASV system which was combined the
VLD module with the ASV system was evaluated. The proce-
dure of the VLD+ASV system is shown in Figure 1. Table 2 il-
lustrates the EERs of the ASV system with or without pop noise,
and the EER of the VLD+ASV system. From the results, the
spoofing attacks degrade the ASV performance. In this experi-
ment, since the spoofing attacks are made by enrollment speech
recorded with HEADSET microphone, the spoofing attacks be-
came weak via the VOICE microphone. However, the EERs via
HEADSET or CAM microphones is strongly affected from the
spoofing attacks. Besides, the EER of the VLD+ASV system
is reduced the vulnerabilities to the spoofing attacks adequately.
These results indicate that the proposed framework is definitely
effective against the spoofing attack sounds.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, novel VLD algorithms are proposed To reduce
the vulnerabilities to spoofing attacks using speaker verification
systems, the ASV systems have to recognize whether an input
voice is live. This quality is known as liveness and ensures that
the measured characteristics come from a live human being and
are captured at the time of verification. The proposed algo-
rithms focused on capturing the pop noises in an input voice
because live humans produce pop noises unconsciously when
they speak. One algorithm based on a single microphone was
proposed to capture the distortion at low frequency as pop noise.
Another algorithm based on two microphones was proposed to
capture the pop noises by comparing the filtered channel with
the non-filtered channel. To evaluate our proposed algorithms,
a database that contains the pop noises was constructed. From
the experimental results, we showed that the VLD algorithms
could capture the pop noises accurately and hence can discrim-
inate live voice signals from artificial ones. Our future work
includes trials using a larger database and extension of the VLD
algorithms to the time series settings. We also need to as-
sess the robustness of the proposed method against a waveform
concatenation-based synthesis method that uses speech record-
ings with pop noise or voice conversion where the input speech
has pop noises.
7. Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scien-
tists (Start-up), 25880026, and Grant-in-Aid for scientific Research (B),
26280066.
8. References
[1] A. Jain, P. Flynn, and A. Ross, “Handbook of biometrics,” 2007.
[2] N. Poh and J. Korczak, “Hybrid biometric person authentication
using face and voice features,” in Audio- and Video-Based Bio-
metric Person Authentication, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, J. Bigun and F. Smeraldi, Eds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2001, vol. 2091, pp. 348–353.
[3] N. Dehak, P. Kenny, R. Dehak, P. Dumouchel, and P. Ouel-
let, “Front-end factor analysis for speaker verification,” Audio,
Speech, and Language Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 19,
no. 4, pp. 788–798, May 2011.
[4] “NIST i-vector Challenge 2014,”
http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/ivec.cfm.
[5] S. Prince and J. Elder, “Probabilistic linear discriminant analysis
for inferences about identity,” in Computer Vision, 2007. ICCV
2007. IEEE 11th International Conference on, Oct 2007, pp. 1–8.
[6] H. Zen, K. Tokuda, and A. W. Black, “Statistical parametric
speech synthesis,” Speech Communication, vol. 51, no. 11, pp.
1039 – 1064, 2009.
[7] A. Hunt and A. Black, “Unit selection in a concatenative speech
synthesis system using a large speech database,” in Acoustics,
Speech, and Signal Processing, 1996. ICASSP-96. Conference
Proceedings., 1996 IEEE International Conference on, vol. 1,
May 1996, pp. 373–376 vol. 1.
[8] Y. Stylianou, “Voice transformation: A survey,” in Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing, 2009. ICASSP 2009. IEEE Inter-
national Conference on, April 2009, pp. 3585–3588.
[9] N. Evans, T. Kinnunen, and J. Yamagishi, “Spoofing and coun-
termeasures for automatic speaker verification,” in Interspeech,
2013, pp. 925–929.
[10] N. W. D. Evans, T. Kinnunen, J. Yamagishi, Z. Wu, F. Alegre, and
P. De Leon, Speaker recognition anti-spoofing. Book Chapter in
”Handbook of Biometric Anti-spoofing”, Springer, S. Marcel, S.
Li and M. Nixon, Eds., 2014, June 2014.
[11] N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell, and R. M. Bolle, “Enhancing secu-
rity and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems,” IBM
Systems Journal, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 614–634, 2001.
[12] L.-W. Chen, W. Guo, and L.-R. Dai, “Speaker verification against
synthetic speech,” in Chinese Spoken Language Processing (ISC-
SLP), 2010 7th International Symposium on, Nov 2010, pp. 309–
312.
[13] Z.-Z. Wu, C. E. Siong, and H. Li, “Detecting converted speech and
natural speech for anti-spoofing attack in speaker recognition.” in
INTERSPEECH, 2012.
[14] M. Faundez-Zanuy, M. Hagmller, and G. Kubin, “Speaker
verification security improvement by means of speech
watermarking,” Speech Communication, vol. 48, no. 12, pp.
1608 – 1619, 2006, {NOLISP} 2005. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167639306000653
[15] M. Nematollahi, S. Al-Haddad, S. Doraisamy, and M. Ranjbari,
“Digital speech watermarking for anti-spoofing attack in speaker
recognition,” in Region 10 Symposium, 2014 IEEE, April 2014,
pp. 476–479.
[16] A. Sizov, E. Khoury, T. Kinnunen, Z. Wu, and S. Marcel, “Joint
speaker verification and antispoofing in the i -vector space,” In-
formation Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 10,
no. 4, pp. 821–832, April 2015.
[17] R. McClanahan, B. Stewart, and P. De Leon, “Performance of i-
vector speaker verification and the detection of synthetic speech,”
in Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2014 IEEE
International Conference on, May 2014, pp. 3779–3783.
[18] J. Gaka, M. Grzywacz, and R. Samborski, “Playback attack detec-
tion for text-dependent speaker verification over telephone chan-
nels,” Speech Communication, vol. 67, no. 0, pp. 143 – 153, 2015.
[19] I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, and S. Marcel, “On the effectiveness of
local binary patterns in face anti-spoofing,” in Biometrics Special
Interest Group (BIOSIG), 2012 BIOSIG - Proceedings of the In-
ternational Conference of the, Sept 2012, pp. 1–7.
[20] D. Yambay, J. Doyle, K. Bowyer, A. Czajka, and S. Schuckers,
“Livdet-iris 2013 - iris liveness detection competition 2013,” in
Biometrics (IJCB), 2014 IEEE International Joint Conference on,
Sept 2014, pp. 1–8.
[21] N. Evans, S. Li, S. Marcel, and A. Ross, “Guest editorial special
issue on biometric spoofing and countermeasures,” Information
Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 10, no. 4, pp.
699–702, April 2015.
[22] B. Toth, “Liveness detection: Iris,” in Encyclopedia of Biometrics,
S. Li and A. Jain, Eds. Springer US, 2009, pp. 931–938.
[23] S. Schuckers, “Liveness detection: Fingerprint,” in Encyclopedia
of Biometrics, S. Li and A. Jain, Eds. Springer US, 2009, pp.
924–931.
[24] X. Tan, Y. Li, J. Liu, and L. Jiang, “Face liveness detection from a
single image with sparse low rank bilinear discriminative model,”
in Computer Vision ECCV 2010, ser. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, K. Daniilidis, P. Maragos, and N. Paragios, Eds.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, vol. 6316, pp. 504–517.
[25] G. Elko, J. Meyer, S. Backer, and J. Peissig, “Electronic pop pro-
tection for microphones,” in Applications of Signal Processing to
Audio and Acoustics, 2007 IEEE Workshop on, Oct 2007, pp. 46–
49.
[26] Y. Hsu, “Spectrum analysis of base-line-popping noise in mr
heads,” Magnetics, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 31, no. 6, pp.
2636–2638, Nov 1995.
[27] T. Matsui and S. Furui, “Concatenated phoneme models for text-
variable speaker recognition,” in Acoustics, Speech, and Signal
Processing, 1993. ICASSP-93., 1993 IEEE International Confer-
ence on, vol. 2, April 1993, pp. 391–394 vol.2.
[28] D. Delacretaz and J. Hennebert, “Text-prompted speaker verifi-
cation experiments with phoneme specific mlps,” in Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing, 1998. Proceedings of the 1998
IEEE International Conference on, vol. 2, May 1998, pp. 777–
780 vol.2.
[29] “NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation (SRE),”
http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/mig/tests/spk/.
[30] Y. Nishida, T. Hori, T. Suehiro, and S. Hirai, “Monitoring of
breath sound under daily environment by ceiling dome micro-
phone,” in Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 2000 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on, vol. 3, 2000, pp. 1822–1829 vol.3.
[31] K. Naraharisetti, “Enhancement of breathing signal using delay-
less subband adaptive filter with hpf,” in Signal Processing and
Information Technology (ISSPIT), 2010 IEEE International Sym-
posium on, Dec 2010, pp. 177–181.
[32] K. Ito, M. Yamamoto, K. Takeda, T. Takezawa, T. Matsuoka,
T. Kobayashi, K. Shikano, and S. Itahashi, “Jnas: Japanese speech
corpus for large vocabulary continuous speech recognition re-
search,” the Acoustical Society of Japan (E), vol. 20, no. 3, pp.
199–206, 1999.
[33] J. Yamagishi and T. Kobayashi, “Average-voice-based speech
synthesis using hsmm-based speaker adaptation and adaptive
training,” IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems,
vol. 90, no. 2, pp. 533–543, 2007.
[34] S. Watanabe, A. Nakamura, and B.-H. Juang, “Structural bayesian
linear regression for hidden markov models,” Journal of Signal
Processing Systems, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 341–358, 2014.
[35] D. Reynolds, T. Quatieri, and R. Dunn, “Speaker verificaion us-
ing adapted gaussian mixture models,” Degital Signal Orocess,
vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 19–41, 2000.
